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Abstract
Background: In this study the focus is on social insurance officers judging applications for disability
pensions. The number of applications for disability pension increased during the late 1990s, which
has resulted in an increasing number of disability pensions in Sweden. A more restrictive attitude
towards the clients has however evolved, as societal costs have increased and governmental
guidelines now focus on reducing costs. As a consequence, the quantitative and qualitative demands
on social insurance officers when handling applications for disability pensions may have increased.
The aim of this study was therefore to describe the social insurance officers' experiences of
assessing applications for disability pensions after the government's introduction of stricter
regulations.
Methods: Qualitative methodology was employed and a total of ten social insurance officers
representing different experiences and ages were chosen. Open-ended interviews were performed
with the ten social insurance officers. Data was analysed with inductive content analysis.
Results:  Three themes could be identified as problematic in the social insurance officers'
descriptions of dealing with the applications in order to reach a decision on whether the issue
qualified applicants for a disability pension or not: 1. Clients are heterogeneous. 2. Ineffective and
time consuming waiting for medical certificates impede the decision process. 3. Perspectives on the
issue of work capacity differed among different stakeholders. The backgrounds of the clients differ
considerably, leading to variation in the quality and content of applications. Social insurance officers
had to make rapid decisions within a limited time frame, based on limited information, mainly on
the basis of medical certificates that were often insufficient to judge work capacity. The role as
coordinating actor with other stakeholders in the welfare system was perceived as frustrating, since
different stakeholders have different goals and demands. The social insurance officers experience
lack of control over the decision process, as regulations and other stakeholders restrict their work.
Conclusion: A picture emerges of difficulties due to disharmonized systems, stakeholder-bound
goals causing some clients to fall between two stools, or leading to unnecessary waiting times,
which may limit the clients' ability to take an active part in a constructive process. Increased
communication with physicians about how to elaborate the medical certificates might improve the
quality of certificates and thereby reduce the clients waiting time.
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Background
The task of the social insurance offices in Sweden is to
administer the social insurance system and ensure that
people receive the benefits and allowances to which they
are entitled [1,2]. In this study we focus on social insur-
ance officers processing applications for disability pen-
sions. In an international comparison of evaluation of
disability [3], it was noted that it was difficult to find a
common basis for disability pension in fifteen different
countries, most of them in Western Europe. There were
dissimilarities between the countries, not only regarding
the criteria for disability pension, but also in the organisa-
tion and control of benefit recipients.
In Sweden applications for disability pensions increased
during the late 1990s which has resulted in an increasing
number of disability pensions. To decrease sickness rates,
clients with long-term sickness absence have to a great
extent been granted disability pensions instead of sickness
benefit on the initiative of the social insurance officers [4].
This trend is also seen in other European countries. In
2003 approximately 62,000 people in Sweden were
granted disability pensions, while five percent of the
applications for disability pension were rejected. During
the 1990s there was a gradual tightening up on require-
ments, with more stringent definitions of what constitutes
loss of work capacity, based on medical criteria [5].
Reforms have been realized in order to decrease costs
related to sickness absence and disability pensions. The
social insurance agency as well as the economic security
systems is struggling with both structural and financial
problems. The agencies in charge of handling complicated
cases have to meet the expanding requirements. Many cli-
ents do not only fit into one benefit system but have to be
handled by more than one agent of the social security sys-
tem, which demands cooperation and communication
between different welfare agents [4,6].
A more restrictive attitude towards the clients has evolved,
which has increased the demands on social insurance
officers when handling applications for disability pen-
sions. In 1997 stricter regulations came into force and
social insurance officers were instructed to coordinate
measures between stakeholders, in order to minimize
absence from work due to illness and to promote return
to work. Psychosocial and labour market aspects were
excluded as acceptable reasons for a disability pension.
These changes in the social insurance system are expected
to influence the social insurance officers' experience of
dealing with applications for disability pensions. One
consequence found, is that the demands on social insur-
ance officers have increased in recent years and their work-
ing conditions have deteriorated [7-9].
The formal basis in the Swedish social insurance system
for assessing disability pension and other forms of sick-
ness benefits is solely based on the assumption that work
ability is reduced due to medically defined illness. Accord-
ing to Swedish legislation, people whose work capacity is
permanently reduced by at least 25 percent as a result of
physical or mental illness or impairment are eligible for
temporary, full, or partial disability pension [2]. The disa-
bility pension is paid on the basis of earnings. The person
applies him/herself, or the social insurance office pro-
poses that a long-term sickness benefit should be replaced
by a disability pension. An application for disability pen-
sion may also be proposed to apply for disability pension
by a physician, or by officers at the employment office or
social services. Social insurance officers always deal with
the applications. In the current study the social insurance
officers handled 100–175 cases at the same time. There is
a governmental recommendation that clients should
return to work or be transferred from long-term sick leave
to disability pensions within 12 months, if possible [4].
The social insurance officers summarises all the informa-
tion of a case to form the basis for a formal decision by the
Social Insurance Board. The judgments in the social insur-
ance board will to 90 percent follow the recommenda-
tions of the officer reporting the cases [2,10,11]. The
decision is based on assessment of the applicant's reduced
work capacity due to medical reasons [2] and the judge-
ment is based on a medical certificate. Thus the medical
certificates sent to social insurance offices are of great
importance. The physician has a major function in com-
pleting the extended medical certificate with details of
diagnoses and treatment, functional limitations, rehabili-
tation measures, date of recovery, and, finally, whether or
not work capacity is reduced [9]. Earlier studies high-
lighted that physicians do not receive sufficient knowl-
edge of various working conditions during their training
[12-14], and that they find it difficult to keep up with
changing social insurance regulations [15]. Social insur-
ance physician has a consultant role on medical matters,
and for assessments of the need for additional examina-
tions and rehabilitation. The social insurance physician
may refer the client for further assessment by insurance
medical specialists such as physiotherapists, qualified
social workers, behavioural scientists or physicians with
specific competence to improve assessments of work
capacity [10].
The traditional role of the social insurance officer has
been that of the objective and impersonal civil servant or
public service worker, putting the regulations into prac-
tice. Changes in social policy have led to an extended role
with an increased number of face-to-face encounters with
citizens [7]. Hensing et al found three areas where dilem-
mas in handling clients occur. The first dilemma concerns
cooperation with other stakeholders, and occurs becauseBMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
Page 3 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
of divergent goals and routines among the various agents.
Waiting for medical examinations and medical certificates
are examples, as are referrals to the unemployment office,
irrespective of the type of benefit dealt with by the social
insurance officer. Another dilemma is due to insufficiency
in internal routines. Not every situation is covered by leg-
islation, and there is a need for flexibility on the part of
the social insurance officers. Finally, client management
dilemmas occur, due to difficulties in assessing work
capacity. Complicated medical problems, a changing
labour market, unemployment and language difficulties,
are factors that may complicate the assessment of work
capacity.
In a study on clients' meetings with social insurance offic-
ers and professionals within the health care sector [16] it
was found that women perceived their contact as more
supportive than men did. Clients with disability pensions
experienced their contact with the social insurance officer
as more supportive and empowering than clients without
disability pensions. There is a need for more knowledge of
how clients in general perceive treatment and contact with
professionals working within social insurance and health
care. There is also a lack of studies on how social insurance
officers perform and practise their work, in particular
when the prerequisites are changes in legislation.
The aim of this study was to describe the social insurance
officers' experiences of assessing applications for disabil-
ity pensions after the government's introduction of stricter
regulations.
The research questions are:
• How do the social insurance officers experience the basis
for the decision- making process according to law and reg-
ulations?
• How do the social insurance officers experience facings
the clients after the change to stricter regulations?
Methods
On the basis of descriptions of social welfare, open-ended
interviews were judged to be a suitable method for data
collection, in order to understand the respondents' per-
spectives and experiences [17]. The interviews were per-
formed with social insurance officers and conducted using
a thematic guide as a basis. The main focus was the proc-
ess of handling the applications. The open-ended ques-
tions allowed the respondents to describe how they
experienced their day-to-day work with applications for
disability pensions. When using interviews as a method of
data collection it is important to remember that interview-
ing is a way of conversing that is based on and dependent
on culturally implicit assumptions about understandings
of beliefs, experiences, feelings and intentions [18]. Inter-
action between the respondent and the interviewer is thus
of importance, but in this study it is the content that is in
focus, not the interaction.
Procedure
To reach the social insurance officers, a letter was sent to
the heads of four regional social insurance offices,
requesting contact with social insurance officers dealing
with applications for disability pensions. The interview
subjects then voluntarily registered for participation at
staff meetings in the four districts. The interviewer selected
ten subjects from among the volunteers. They were all
contacted by telephone to arrange an interview and
informed about the study by the interviewer (BY). They
then received a letter presenting the aims of the study and
information about their voluntary participation, with a
guarantee of confidentiality and a suggestion as to where
the interview should take place. All ten were willing to
participate in the study. The audio-taped interviews were
carried out in Jan-March 2004 at the respondents' work-
places. Each interview lasted about 1–1.5 hours. A secre-
tary experienced in transcribing interviews transcribed the
interviews verbatim.
Participants
The participants in the study were from a region where
approximately 100 social insurance officers performed
applications for disability pensions. The officers also had
to judge other kind of applications as sickness benefits.
The educational background for most of the officers was
primary or secondary school and in-service training at the
social insurance offices. The younger social insurance
officers, about 10 percent, had an academic background.
The educational background among the participants in
this study reflected their category of educational back-
ground, but among all staff-members irrespective of their
work function, 20 percent had an academic background
[19]. Eight women and two men from the region were
included, representing different ages, experiences and geo-
graphical district. The division between women and men
reflected the distribution according to sex among all staff
in the social insurance offices in the actual county [19].
Four individuals worked in the main municipality and six
in smaller districts. Seven were older than 50 years of age
and three were younger, which also corresponded to the
general picture of the age of other employees in this
organisation [19]. Experience of working in the social
insurance office varied between 3 years and 40 years. The
participants' different work experience, age and gender
were expected to provide variations in their statements
about handling applications for disability pensions.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
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Analysis
The transcript data were analysed using an inductive con-
tent analysis [17]. The material was analysed by the inter-
viewer (BY) and a researcher experienced in analysing
qualitative data (KN). They first read and re-read the tran-
script texts to familiarize themselves with the data. There-
after units of meaning, i.e. statements and sentences,
answering the aim of the study, were noted in the mar-
gins. The second step was to group these units in themes
according to their content. As the work continued, the
content of each theme was expanded or reduced by com-
paring the themes, and new questions concerning the data
arose: questions such as 'What is seen in the groups?' or
'What stands out?' Finally the themes described in the
results were reached. Having two separate analysers made
it possible to control, at least to some degree, subjectivity
and preconceptions in the analysis, and the procedure
ensures conformability [20]. The results of agreement in
analysing data between the two co-examiners were about
85 %. Points of disagreement were restored through dis-
cussion between the authors [21].
Ethical considerations
This study followed the Humanistic-Social Research
Council Ethics Rules [22]. The committee for research eth-
ics at the University of Örebro in Sweden approved the
study. Special emphasis was placed on informing the par-
ticipants about the study, obtaining their consent and
treating their statements confidentially. The quotations in
the results are used to exemplify the statements of the
individual respondents.
Results
Three themes could be identified in the social insurance
officers' descriptions of difficulty in assessing the applica-
tions for disability pensions towards a decision on
whether the applicant's symptoms or illness qualified
them for a disability pension. These are: 1. Clients are het-
erogeneous. 2. Ineffective and time-consuming waiting
for medical certificates impedes the decision process. 3.
Perspectives on the issue of work capacity differed among
different stakeholders. Each of these themes will be
described separately below.
Clients are Heterogeneous
The typical applicant for a disability pension is an individ-
ual who has been on long-term sick leave. This applica-
tion does not cause the social insurance officer any
problems. Neither are re-assessing applicants with a tem-
porary disability pension problematic. Those two kinds of
applications represent about 80 percent of all applica-
tions. Applications from those who have neuro-psychiat-
ric diagnoses such as ADHD (Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder), Asperger's syndrome or autism
are however more difficult to handle, as these assessments
are more time-consuming and often demand an extended
assessment to obtain clarification of medical status. The
client may for example have studied at a special school for
some years and the reasons for the applicant's problems in
the ordinary school system may not have been made clear.
The necessary clarification is obtained in different ways,
depending on the individual.
And then you ask yourself: how is it possible that this
person has gone through more or less his entire edu-
cation without anyone really getting to the bottom of
what the problems are (R5).
Several social insurance officers also talked about unem-
ployed younger people, less than 30 years of age, as a
problematic group of applicants to judge, especially after
the regulations had become stricter. These clients may
have participated in several activities leading to better
health and when they are ready for practical experience at
a workplace, the employment office should provide this.
In these cases the social insurance officers had to encour-
age the clients to contact the employment office. Often
the social insurance officers experienced problems, as the
employment officers tend to be overloaded with ordinary
unemployed people and have little time for clients with
special needs. The implications are that some clients who
are motivated to work risk having to wait passively for
employment activities.
They [Employment Officers] are overloaded right now
and can't handle any more. But then you've got to look
at the way it's organized. I mean, in that case there
must be something wrong with it (R5).
Another group of applicants that cause the social insur-
ance officer problems are immigrants and refugees, as
some of them suffer from unspecified disorders. This
group has also increased in number during the last dec-
ade, i.e. during the same period as a tightening-up on pub-
lic economy in society has occurred. Immigrants and
refugees may sometimes 'somatise' their mental symp-
toms, as interpreted by the social insurance officers. Vague
symptoms or health problems are more difficult for the
physicians to fit into the diagnosis coding system and it is
also more difficult for them to make prognoses about
future work capacity. Some social insurance officers also
said they felt uncomfortable in encounters with immi-
grants. One social insurance officer said 'we social insur-
ance officers have to become better at dealing with and
understanding other cultures' (R3). Social insurance offic-
ers also said they were uncertain about the quality of med-
ical certificates as they do not know if possible difficulties
in the client's background, for example torture or experi-
ences of war, have been brought to light in the encounter
with the physician.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
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Then of course there are often psychological problems
that haven't been assessed (in the medical certificate).
For example they may have been tortured when they
perhaps come from a war-torn region (R9).
Social insurance officers also emphasize how difficult it is
to judge applications from young, female single parents
suffering from stress-related symptoms such as headaches;
diffuse neck-shoulder pain and tiredness. There are com-
plexities in these clients' problems, as they often have a
low education, several children, and work in low-paid
jobs.
I mean, it's a complex picture. It's linked to work, the
social situation, and, yes, everything (R4).
The social insurance officers consequently find it under-
standable that these women with great responsibility and
'strenuous work' develop long-lasting disorders but they
have difficulty getting through their applications.
Ineffective and time-consuming waiting for the medical 
certificates impedes the decision process
Social insurance officers often have problems in receiving
the medical certificate that is required by law as a basis for
the disability pension assessment, in reasonable time. It is
more difficult for the applicant to be referred to specialists
for medical examinations than it is to obtain an examina-
tion by a general practitioner at a primary health care cen-
tre. This difficulty affects in particular those vulnerable
groups described in the previous theme. The social insur-
ance officers say that they often have to remind the physi-
cians to send the certificate, especially specialist
certificates.
But this business of getting them to send in a medical
certificate can be really, can take a really long time
nowadays (R8).
Another problem mentioned by the social insurance offic-
ers is that of 'temporary physicians' employed in the pri-
mary health care system. The social insurance officers
reported a shortage of permanent general practitioners in
the informants' region. 'The temporary physicians' do not
have the same time to form a deeper relation with the
patients compared with the permanent general practi-
tioner, as 'the temporary physician' meets almost every
patient only once. This problem of filling medical posi-
tions in the primary health care organization causes fur-
ther delays with the certificates.
And it's the same thing with people being on the sick
list for a long time; I think one of the reasons is that
the doctors don't have time to get to grips with the
problem, or they think 'I'm only here temporarily, I'll
just extend it (the sickness certificate). And then the
next one comes along and is also only there temporar-
ily (R6).
Even if the medical certificates are received within a rea-
sonable time they are often incomplete and require sup-
plementary assessments or comments if they are to be
usable as a basis for the social insurance officer's investi-
gation before a decision is made at the Social Insurance
Board.
Sometimes we sort of don't really get answers to what
we need. It may be descriptions of different things and
functions and so on. But still not a real sort of progno-
sis, and how long the condition will last, whether it's
something that will disappear in a few months or a
year, or never. You don't get, they don't take a stand on
it, and then it's sort of very difficult to make a decision
(R7).
When certificates are incomplete, the social insurance
officers need to ask the physicians employed at the Social
Insurance Board, who are advisers and consultants on
medical matters, for a statement about the need for addi-
tional examinations and rehabilitation. Consulting the
social insurance physician is time-consuming and may
cause further delays if the social insurance physician refers
the client for further assessments by insurance medical
specialists such as physiotherapists, behavioural scientists
or physicians with specific competence to perform assess-
ments of work capacity. In this way the decision-making
procedure is prolonged. Social insurance officers some-
times experience these assessments as a waste of time, as
the additional information sometimes does not contrib-
ute to the basis for judgement of work capacity.
And then maybe you have to wait for six months to a
year for the assessment that anyway is going to say no,
it's not possible to do anything about it. And that's a
big problem. Yes, you've got to wait a long time what-
ever it is, I think, a really long time (R10).
This occasionally time-consuming waiting for different
assessments frustrates the social insurance officers as they
feel responsible for the time the client has to wait. This
responsibility is reinforced by social insurance officers'
experience of feeling over-burdened by a heavy caseload.
As long as they has an unsatisfactory assessment to present
to the Social Insurance Board, no decision can be made on
whether to grant a disability pension or not. The social
insurance officer is aware of the problem this may cause
the client; for example, not having enough money to pay
their bills. One social insurance officer expresses her
empathy with the client in the following way:BMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
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I mean, I can't just say I don't care about this today if
they've got to have money for something; there are
dates when bills have to be paid and all that. So this is
the pressure you have on you that you've got to get it
done by that day; it's their livelihood after all (R1).
The social insurance officers explained that they are
responsible for writing a memorandum as a basis for a
decision on a disability pension at the Social Insurance
Board, even if there is no medical certificate. Presenting an
incomplete memorandum and knowing that the applica-
tion will be rejected by the Social Insurance Board, is
expressed as a problem by the social insurance officers,
both for the clients as they have to submit a re-applica-
tion, and for their own job satisfaction.
Perspectives on the issue of work capacity differed among 
different stakeholders
The social insurance officers consider that there are diffi-
culties due to the fact that the authorities, such as social
insurance offices, employment offices and social services,
have different definitions of the concept of work capacity.
Social insurance officers make decisions on work capacity
in relation to sickness. Therefore the physicians' certifi-
cates are important for the social insurance officers' assess-
ments, but sometimes the physicians avoid judging work
capacity.
In the medical certificates they have difficulty formu-
lating what kind of work capacity there is. There's usu-
ally a diagnosis and what kind of (medical) problems
they have. But how this limits (the individual) in
working; they themselves think that's difficult (R9).
Social insurance officers mention that sometimes there
may be doubts about which authority is responsible for
providing financial support for an individual. In some
cases individuals are requested by the employment office
to apply for disability pensions, as the employment office
regards the client as not healthy enough to be employable.
The employment office might also direct clients to apply
to the social welfare office for financial support. Here sim-
ilar problems may occur in the assessment of the individ-
ual's health and work ability, i.e. these authorities
consider the client too ill to grant unemployment com-
pensation or social welfare. When the applicant comes to
the social insurance office he or she may not have been in
contact with the health care centre and may be unable to
get the necessary medical certificate. When the social
insurance officer assesses work capacity in relation to
medical status, clients may however be considered
healthy enough to be able to work, which eliminates their
chance of applying for a disability pension. The fact that
social insurance officer and other stakeholders have differ-
ent interpretations of the concept 'work capacity' is exem-
plified in the following:
Perhaps we juggle with the applicants, no, but we can
say 'then the social welfare office will have to take care
of that', and the social welfare office may have thought
'well, but they are rather ill, they haven't got a chance
of earning their living'. So of course they're borderline
cases everywhere (R10).
Discussion
The aim of this study was to describe the social insurance
officers' experiences of assessing applications for disabil-
ity pensions during a period with stricter regulations.
Interviews with social insurance officers proved to be a
suitable method for collecting data for the purpose of the
study. All the respondents were motivated to participate,
and interested in talking about their experience of the
process of reaching a decision on applications for disabil-
ity pension, which contributed to comprehensive inter-
views. Even if there is a positive atmosphere during the
interview, the interview situation can be affected by inter-
viewees' preconceptions about changes in social insur-
ance regulations and problems this can cause the social
insurance officer. Furthermore, the analysis can also be
affected by the understanding of the researchers [17]. To
minimize these risks, we attempted during the research
process to maintain an awareness of our understanding
from the field. Generalizing the results from the study is
not possible, but the indicated problems that were
described in the process may be transferred to similar
social insurance units and settings.
The results indicate that applications for individuals from
special sub-groups were more complicated to process than
those from ordinary clients. As social insurance officers
seem to have difficulty assessing some applications in a
proper way and in line with the intentions in the primary
texts of the law, one must question the extent to which the
officers get support and training to interpret changes in
laws and legislations. The support given from social insur-
ance physicians seems to be of a more formal character
concerning medical certificates and, particularly, the
assessment of work capacity.
Söderberg [9] found in her review study of social insur-
ance officers as "gatekeepers" that they sometimes used
their decision latitude to prioritize clients who were easier
to deal with, e.g. men or non-immigrants, even though
this was against the rules. The results in this study do not
support Söderberg's findings of prioritizing ordinary
groups, but show that social insurance officers find appli-
cations from some groups of individuals more difficult to
deal with. To manage these problematic applications,
social insurance officers may need increased knowledgeBMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
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on how the insurance system should be applied for vari-
ous clients in order to reduce frustration in the decision-
making process and to minimize the lack of equivalence
in the decisions. This statement about in-service training
is supported by Hensing [7], who points to the fact that
social insurance officers have no access to scientific or
consensus agreement on which to base their assessments.
Social insurance officers in this study described working
with clients with different backgrounds, and that they felt
forced to make rapid decisions within a limited time
frame, based on limited information mainly from medi-
cal certificates. The applications may suffer from insuffi-
cient investigations by other stakeholders, which leads to
a more difficult and time-consuming decision process for
the social insurance officer. This front-line work at the
social insurance office could be seen in the light of Lip-
sky's [23] theory of street-level bureaucrats. He argued
that street-level bureaucrats often work with lack of
resources, as well as diffuse and ambiguous agency goals,
which was essentially confirmed in this study. When
social insurance officers process the clients' applications
for disability pensions, they represent the policies of the
social insurance system and feel forced to live up to rules
and legislation [2]. As street-level bureaucrats they are
expected to implement public policy when interacting
with clients [23]. But Lipsky also argues that the street-
level bureaucrats have an opportunity to find their own
way of handling the dilemma to be in-between the clients
and the policies in society. As mentioned above, Söder-
berg [9] also found that social insurance officers used their
decision latitude to prioritize. Therefore it is interesting to
find that the results indicate that social insurance officers
virtually uncritically follow the rules and deliver incom-
plete memorandums to the Social Insurance Board, rather
than taking a more offensive attitude to solve the problem
of incomplete and delayed medical certificates.
An obvious hindrance in the process of assessing the
application was the waiting time, as medical certificates
came in late and were often insufficient. Several studies
[12-14] emphasize physicians' insufficient knowledge of
clients' working conditions. Communication between the
two authorities is hampered by the fact that they each
have a different basis for evaluation; in medical care the
patient's health is the core issue, while the social insur-
ance system focuses on the economic and public service
perspectives to be applied to the client's individual needs.
The dependence on other stakeholders, in particular phy-
sicians, causes social insurance officers to lose control
over the process of assessment. In some cases they have a
clear opinion on what is best for the client, but they are
unable to fulfil this as long as communication with the
physician is unsatisfactory or lacking. The social insurance
officers may even distrust the physicians' certificates in
some cases and be ambivalent regarding these different
sets of values. The lack of communication and common
goal-setting between the stakeholders causes unnecessary
waiting for the client and also makes the decision process
more difficult. This 'communication hub' between differ-
ent stakeholders in getting the client assessed for a disabil-
ity pension was described by Lipsky [23]. Inadequate
communication may partly be due to differences in regu-
lations, values and goals, but may also be a result of dif-
ferences in perceived position, especially to physicians in
the health care system.
It is conceivable that the waiting time frustrates the social
insurance officers, as they feel responsible to their clients.
Social insurance officers have face-to-face contact with cli-
ents but are at the same time obstructed from doing a high
quality job; this may cause considerable strain. It was also
seen that the long waiting time influenced the decision-
making process, as some applications were assessed on an
incomplete basis for decision-making. From the client's
point of view, such a risk can be perceived as a relief, but
at the same time it may be an obstacle for return to work.
It may also increase the risk of differences between indi-
vidual cases in the decisions taken. This interpretation has
been described earlier by Hensing [7], who stated that the
practice of social insurance officers is of great importance
for clients.
The results showed that work capacity, which is a core
concept in the decision process, seemed to cause commu-
nication problems between different authorities. The
problem of communicating work capacity between
authorities may have increased when the number of peo-
ple in need of financial support from society, for example
in terms of unemployment benefits, sickness benefits or
disability pensions, has increased [5,24]. The social insur-
ance officer's process of decision-making is influenced by
ambivalence between empathy for the client on the one
hand, and the regulations, which do not accept psychoso-
cial problems or unemployment as a reason for disability
pension, on the other. According to Hensing et al [7],
changes in social policy have also led to an extended role
for social insurance officers, which may contribute to the
existing difficulties in interpreting reduced work capacity.
The result implies that there is lack of coordinated actions
between authorities. This is a confirmation of Hensing
and her colleagues' study [7], where her respondents
described the pressure to end long-lasting cases as a "mis-
sion impossible", as some were not covered by insurance
rules. Social insurance officers raised the question of
whether disability pension was a failure that reflected
incompetence among actors, or whether it indicated an
impossible labour market for individuals with unclear
health problems. Lipsky [23] describes it as "a way of deal-BMC Public Health 2007, 7:128 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/128
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ing with clients in need, without really dealing with
them". The social insurance officer is a sort of "gate-
keeper" regarding the client's entitlement to disability
pension. This "gate-keeping task" in encounters between
social insurance officers and clients has not been studied
to any great degree in relation to assessing applications for
disability pensions. Gard [25] and Klanghed [26] studied
similar encounters when rehabilitation professionals
worked with people in the rehabilitation process. Recon-
ciliation of differences between various authorities
appears to be a core issue in improving welfare processes.
Also Friesen [27] and Baril [28] discuss how delays of all
types, including ineffective communication among stake-
holders, influenced return to work. Friesen [27] indicated
how e.g. the insurance system and health service system
functioned partly in parallel on one level, while the indi-
viduals function in-between on another level.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to describe the social insurance
officers' experiences of assessing applications for disabil-
ity pensions after stricter regulations were introduced.
Problems described were: the many different clients that
could not be considered as uniform, the ineffective and
time-consuming delays in communicating with the med-
ical care services and, finally, divergent perspectives on the
issue of work capacity among different stakeholders. The
different perspectives contributed to the difficulties that
occurred in communication between the actors. The role
as co-ordinator with other stakeholders in the welfare sys-
tem was experienced as frustrating, since goals and
demands differed between them. The officers worked with
clients with manifold backgrounds and had to make rapid
decisions within a limited time frame, based on limited
information mainly obtained from medical certificates.
A picture emerged of difficulties due to disharmonized
systems, stakeholder-bound goals, causing some clients to
fall between two stools or leading to unnecessary waiting
times, which limited clients' ability to take an active part
in a constructive process. To reduce the social insurance
officers' stressful working conditions, especially during
periods of implementing changes in regulations, it would
be of importance with increased management support
and training. There was also a need of increased commu-
nication with the physicians about how to elaborate the
medical certificates as the incomplete certificates often
delayed the assessment of applications. The later is not
only in favour to the officers but above all to the appli-
cants.
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